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Abstract
We discuss to which extent the median voter theorem extends to the
domain of single-peaked preferences on median spaces. After observing
that on this domain a Condorcet winner need not exist, we show that
if a Condorcet winner does exist, then it coincides with the median
alternative (“the median voter”). Based on this result, we propose
two non-cooperative games that implement the unique strategy-proof
social choice rule on this domain.
1 Introduction
The median voter theorem (henceforth: MVT) is one of the central theorems
in economic theory. It applies to agents who have to choose one element out
of a set of alternatives. In its classic formulation, the MVT consists of
the following two statements (while in many instances only one of them is
mentioned):
If preferences are single—peaked (on a line), then
(i) there is a neutral and anonymous social choice rule that is
both non-dictatorial and strategy—proof. The unique rule of this
type is to select the favorite alternative of the median voter (Mas-
Colell, Whinston, and Green 1995, e.g.).
(ii) The median voter’s favorite alternative wins in majority vot-
ing against any other alternative, i.e. it is a Condorcet winner
(Congleton 2002, e.g.).
While the first part shows that one can “escape” the negative result
of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite-Theorem, the second part shows that Con-
dorcet’s paradox can not occur. The second part is strongly related to a
Hotelling—Downs model of political competition: In a game between two
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vote maximizing candidates, the unique equilibrium strategy is to choose
the Condorcet winner.
In a seminal contribution Nehring and Puppe (2007b) show that the
MVT part (i) can be extended to a much larger class of preferences–single—
peaked preferences on median spaces, which contain lines, trees, grids, and
hypercubes as special cases. As a starting point of this paper we provide a
simple example showing that this extension of the MVT need not hold for
part (ii) of the MVT, i.e. the median alternative need not be a Condorcet
winner. However, we show for this domain that the median alternative is
the only candidate for a Condorcet winner (Prop. 1), i.e. the correspond-
ing social choice function is Condorcet consistent. Thus, if there is a Nash
equilibrium between two opportunistic (vote maximizing) candidates, then
it must be that both candidates choose the median position (Cor. 1). More-
over, we show that this result is not restricted to opportunistic candidates.
Assuming that politicians are reformists, i.e. they care about the winning
policy (rather than being the winner), this result still holds if the preferences
of the two candidates are “sufficiently heterogeneous” (Prop. 2). Those re-
sults have important consequences for the implementation of the unique
strategy—proof social choice rule, which we discuss to conclude this note.
2 Set-up
Let  = {1 2 } be a finite (and fixed) set of alternatives (e.g. social
states, policies, political positions) of size || ≥ 3 Let  = {1 2  } be a
finite set of voters. The voters are endowed with (complete and transitive)
preferences on the alternatives . º:= (º)∈ denotes a profile of such
preferences andD stands for the domain of all such preferences. A Condorcet
winner is an alternative  satisfying the following property: ∀ ∈  it holds
that #{ ∈  |  Â } ≥ #{ ∈  |  Â }
In order to define the relevant domain of preferences, we define prop-
erty spaces and generalized single—peakedness following Nehring and Puppe
(2007b). A set of basic (binary) properties H is extensionally defined via
the alternatives: H ⊆ 2 , where  ∈ H stands for a property possessed
by exactly all alternatives  ∈ . A pair (H) is called a property space
if for each property  ∈ H it holds that it is non-empty and  ∈ H; and
for each pair of alternatives  6=  there is a property such that  ∈  and
 ∈ . A pair () is an issue.
A natural relation for a property space is to say that  is between  and
 if it shares all of their common properties.
Definition 1 (Betweenness) Let (H) be a property space. H(⊂  ×
 ×): ∀   ∈ 
(  ) ∈ H ⇐⇒ [∀ ∈ H : { } ⊆  ⇒  ∈ ] (1)
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By definition (  ) ∈ H for any  , and H The class of prop-
erty spaces under consideration satisfies the following condition: A property
space (H) is a median space if ∀   ∈ , there exists a  such that
{( ) ( ) ( )} ⊆ H
Median spaces have several desirable properties (Van de Vel 1993), some
of which we are going to exploit.1 Let a segment be the set of alternatives
between two alternatives: [ ] := { ∈  : ( ) ∈ H} Two alter-
natives  6=  are neighbors if [ ] = { }. Let () denote the set of
neighbors of alternative 
The central assumption on preferences is that they are single—peaked
with respect to a given median space:
Definition 2 A profile of preferences º (on ) is single—peaked on the
property space H if any voter’s preferences are single—peaked w.r.t. to the
betweenness relation H. That is: for each  ∈  , there exists ∗ ∈  such
that
∀ 6=  ∈  (∗   ) ∈ H =⇒  Â  (2)
For a characterization and an excellent discussion of single—peaked pref-
erences (on median spaces) we refer the reader, again, to Nehring and Puppe
(2007b).
3 The generalization of the median voter theorem
For a profile º of single—peaked preferences and a property  ∈ H, let
() = #{ ∈  | ∗ ∈ } The set of median alternatives is defined
as (H ) := ∩∈H:()≥
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, i.e. the alternatives that only possess
majority properties.2 If the profile of preferences is a median space, then
a median alternative always exists (Nehring and Puppe 2007b). To ease
the exposition, let us assume that the property space is non-degenerate, i.e.
there is no property  such that () = 
2
= (), e.g. by assuming
that  is odd. Then the median alternative is uniquely determined. Fixing
some , letM ⊂ D be the set of preferences profiles, for which there exists
a non-degenerate median space H such that preferences are single—peaked
on H; and let  : M→ be the rule that selects the median alternative,
i.e. (º) =(H ).
1 In particular, for any median space there is a graph () that represents it in the
sense that (  ) ∈ H if and only if  lies on a shortest path between  and 
2 In a graph corresponding to the median space, the median is the node that minimizes
the weighted graph distances, where the weights are the number of voters with each node
(alternative) as favorite alternative, see, e.g., Hansen, Thisse, and Wendell (1986).
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Figure 1: Condorcet’s paradox with single-peaked preferences on a median
space.
Nehring and Puppe (2007b) show in their seminal contribution that me-
dian spaces are the largest single—peaked domain of preferences to which
the MVT extends. (The formulation there is for linear orders and an odd
number of voters.)
Theorem 1 (Nehring & Puppe, 2007)  is neutral, anonymous, non-
dictatorial, and strategy—proof.
This is a substantial generalization of the MVT part (i). Part (ii) does
not extend to this large domain as the following example shows.
Example 1 Let  = {   } and  = {1 2 3} with the following pref-
erences º1= (   ), º2= (   ) º3= (   ) This profile of pref-
erences is single—peaked on the property space H = { = { }  =
{ }  = { }  = { }} (see Figure 1). Moreover, this is a
median space. The weights are () = 2 () = 1 () = 2
and () = 1 The median alternative is (º) =(H ) = ∩
 =  We observe that alternative  is not a Condorcet winner because
 would defeat  by two votes over one.3 Note that in this example no Con-
dorcet winner exists.  and  are defeated by ; and  is defeated, e.g., by 
The paradox of Condorcet illustrated in example 1 is well-known for
general preferences, but it cannot occur for single-peaked preferences on
lines (by the classic MVT part i). The existence of a Condorcet winner can
be extended to tree graphs (Demange 1982), i.e. one-dimensional median
spaces according to the classification of Nehring and Puppe (2007a). As
Example 1 shows, however, the result does not extend, to two-dimensional
median spaces.
3By definition  would win a majority voting on the issues, but not majority voting on
the alternatives.
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Instead of restricting attention to a domain where existence is guaranteed—
e.g., single-peaked preferences on one-dimensional median spaces T —, we
address all median spaces and ask whether  is Condorcet consistent, i.e.
whether  selects the Condorcet winner in case it exists. Let C designate
the set of all preference profiles with a unique Condorcet winner and define
M̌ := C ∩M (i.e. M̌ designates the domain of single-peaked preferences on
a median space for which a Condorcet winner exists). Then T ⊂ M̌ ⊂M
The following result shows that the median alternative is the only candidate
for a Condorcet winner, i.e.  is Condorcet consistent.4
Proposition 1 Suppose º ∈M i.e. º is single—peaked on a median space.
If there exists a Condorcet winner, then it is the median alternative (º)
Proof. Let º ∈M and (º) =  Recall that for any  ∈ H if ()  
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
then  ∈ . Consider any alternative  with  6= .
1. [ ] ∩() 6= {∅} because a median space is connected via pairs of
neighbors.
2. Let  ∈ [ ]∩() In median spaces neighbors differ in exactly one
basic issue (Lemma B.3 in Nehring and Puppe (2007b)). Let ()
be the issue that separates  from  with  ∈  and  ∈ .
3. ∀ ∈  we have (  ) ∈ H This is because any property that
is shared by  and  is also shared by  (since  and  only differ
with respect to ()) Thus single—peakedness implies ∀ ∈  s.t.
∗ ∈  that  Â 
4.  ∈  because (  ) ∈ H (by definition of ) Thus, ()  2 
() (by definition of ). Thus,  defeats  (in the sense that strictly
more voters vote for  against ),
5. Thus, any (6= ) cannot be a Condorcet winner. If there is a Con-
dorcet winner, then it must be 
The condition º ∈ M is necessary for this result. If preferences are
single—peaked on a non—median space, then a median alternative need not
exist and even if it does, the median alternative and the Condorcet winner do
not coincide, in general. Prop. 1 is now used to solve two non—cooperative
games of the Hotelling—Downs type.
4This is well-known for symmetric single-peaked preferences on trees (Hansen, Thisse,
and Wendell 1986). However, the domain here is much larger since we also address multi-
dimensional median spaces.
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4 Interpretation in terms of political candidates
Consider two political candidates  and  who are able to express a political
position. Formally, a strategy for each candidate ( ∈ {}) is to pick an
alternative  ∈  =  Let the strategy space be  =  × . Given
a strategy profile  ∈ , each voter’s preferences over the alternatives 
induce preferences over the candidates . For a given preference profile
º and a strategy profile  let the outcome rule  : D×  → R2 keep track
of how many voters prefer  over  where indifferent voters are counted
with weight 1
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in both entries (º ) and (º ) Let (º ) be the
winning alternative, that is the strategy of the candidate with a majority of
voters–more precisely, (º ) =  if and only if (º ) ≥ (º )5
For the payoffs of the candidates we consider two different assumptions.
If the candidates want to maximize their number of votes, () := Π((º
 )) for some increasing functionΠ we will call them opportunists. Π need
not be strictly increasing; however, we assume that Π(
2





+) Let a reformist be a candidate who is not concerned about winning
the election, but about which political position is winning the election ()
(because this determines the policy that is finally implemented). So, we here
assume that the candidates themselves are endowed with preferences such
as voters are–in particular we will assume that the candidates’ preferences
are single—peaked, as well. Let º stand for the preferences of candidate
 =  on the set  A reformist  ranks strategy profiles in the following
way:  is preferred to 0 if and only if () º (0)
Both assumptions constitute a normal-form game: One for opportunists
Γº = (K  ( )) and one for reformists Γ̃º = {K  (ºº)}. The
games are set-up simultaneously, while sequential moves would not change
the results. We are interested in whether the median rule  can be imple-
mented by such a game. In a game of opportunists a strategy profile is a
Nash equilibrium if and only if it is a Condorcet winner. This leads to the
following corollary of Prop. 1.
Corollary 1 (Opportunists) Let Γº be a game of two opportunists with
º ∈M i.e. º is single—peaked on a median space. Then
( ) ∈ (Γº) =⇒  =  = (º) (3)
If an equilibrium exists–that is ifº ∈ M̌–, then both candidates choose
the median alternative. This includes, for example, single—peaked prefer-
ences on one-dimensional median spaces (corresponding to a tree graph).
Now, consider two reformists   who have single—peaked preferences
on a property space H with median alternative We say that preferences of
5 If there is a tie, we let  be the winning candidate. If  =   then this convention
does not matter.
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two reformists are sufficiently heterogeneous if it holds that (∗   ∗ ) ∈ H
For a one-dimensional median space this means that their favorite alterna-
tives are not in the same branch of the property space, i.e. the same leaf
of the corresponding tree (where the leaves are defined with respect to the
median alternative ) Note that (∗   ∗ ) ∈ H if and only if it holds that
{∗  ∗ }⊆  implies that  ∈  that is ∗ and ∗ do not share a property
 with ()  
2
.
Proposition 2 (Reformists) Suppose º ∈ M̌ i.e. º is single—peaked
on a median space H and there exists a Condorcet winner. Let  = (º)
designate the median alternative (and the Condorcet winner). Let Γ̃º be
a game of two reformists, where (ºº) is single—peaked on H. If the
candidates’ preferences are sufficiently heterogeneous, i.e. (∗   ∗ ) ∈ H,
then (i) ( ) ∈ (Γ̃º) and (ii) ∗ ∈ (Γ̃º)⇒ (∗) = .
Proof. Let º ∈ M̌, (º) = , and let (∗   ∗ ) ∈ H
(i) Since  is a Condorcet winner (by Prop. 1), ( ) =  for any 
with  ∈ {} Thus, @0 that is an improvement for  Thus, ( ) ∈
(Γ̃º)
(ii) We show that if  is such that () 6= , then  ∈ (Γ̃º)
Let () 6=  w.l.o.g. let () =  Let  := [∗  ]∩ [ ] Note first
that  ∈ 
Case 1;  = {} Since H is a median space, there exists an alternative
between the triple   ∗  Thus, (  ∗ ) ∈ H Sufficient heterogeneity
means that (∗   ∗ ) ∈ H Therefore, (∗   ) ∈ H
single—peakedness implies that  Â  = () However, for (any)  it
holds that ( ) =  because  is a Condorcet winner (by Prop. 1).
Therefore, 0 =  is an improving deviation for candidate .
Case 2;  ⊃ {} i.e. ∃ ∈  s.t.  6= . [ ]∩() 6= ∅ because
any two alternatives are connected via a set of neighbors (in a median space).
Let  ∈ [ ] ∩() Because  ∈  and ( ) ∈ H, it holds that
 ∈  Thus, (∗   ) ∈ H implying that  Â  = () Moreover,
 and  differ exactly with respect to one issue–say  ∈ ,  ∈ –
(since this holds true for any pair of neighbors). Therefore, ∀ ∈  we have
(  ) ∈ H Thus, single—peakedness implies for a voter ,  Â  if
and only if ∗ ∈  This implies that ( ) =  because  is a majority
property ( ∈  means that ()  () by construction of ) Therefore,
0 =  is a improving deviation for candidate .
For part (ii) of this result, the assumption of heterogeneous preferences
is necessary. Consider ∗ = ∗ 6=  Then  =  = ∗ constitutes a Nash
equilibrium. The assumption that a Condorcet winner exists is necessary
for the existence of a Nash equilibrium (part i), and for the first case in the
proof of part (ii). Reconsider Example 1 for which it holds that º∈M, but
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º∈ M̌. Let º= (   ) and º= (   ).  = (= () = ∗ ) and
 =  constitutes a Nash equilibrium with () 6=  = (º)
The two results show that for the domain M̌ both games lead to an
implementation of the rule (º).
5 Discussion
We consider voters whose preferences on a set of alternatives (e.g. polit-
ical positions) belong to the largest domain of single—peaked preferences
for which truthful implementation is possible. By a fundamental result
of Nehring and Puppe (2007b), this is the median spaces and the unique
rule  of this type (anonymous, neutral, non-dictatorial, and strategy—
proof social choice rule) selects the median alternative (º)Which institu-
tions/mechanisms do implement this rule?
1. By the revelation principle, we can use a direct mechanism: Voters
communicate their preferences and  is implemented (by some au-
thority).
2. By the proofs of (Nehring and Puppe 2007b), we can define a binary
property space corresponding to the structure of preferences and de-
termine the chosen policy by majority voting on each (political) issue.
Letting each agent vote in favor of the property that is possessed by
his favorite alternative,  is implemented.
3. If there exists a Condorcet winner (e.g. if the corresponding property
space is acyclic), then majority voting on the alternatives themselves
also implements  (Prop. 1).
4. If there exists a Condorcet winner, then we can organize a competition
between two political candidates in order to implement  (Cor. 1 and
Prop. 2).
The fourth possibility can be considered as consisting of the following
three stages. Stage 1: Voters announce their preferences (e.g. on political
positions) in a poll. Stage 2: Two political candidates compete by choosing
an alternative (express a political position). Stage 3: Voters choose a can-
didate by majority voting. This institution leads to an implementation of
the median alternative for the following reasons: In stage 3, there is no in-
centive to deviate from true preferences since there are only two candidates.
In the game played in stage 2, the winning candidate chooses the median
alternative (º) in any Nash equilibrium (Cor. 1 and Prop. 2). In stage
1, voters do not have an incentive to deviate from honesty since rule  is
strategy—proof (Nehring and Puppe 2007b).
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An interesting aspect of rule  is that it only takes the voters’ preference
peaks into account. In that sense, the authority (1.) or the competing can-
didates (4.) need not know the full preferences of the population, but only
the distribution of favorite alternatives.
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